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Abstract:  Many studies have documented adverse health outcomes for uninsured patients.  These 
can be attributed to their health status as well as to the quality of treatment received.  A measure 
of treatment that remains unexplored is the quality of the physicians treating uninsured patients.  
Using education and training, experience, and board certification to measure physician quality, 
we find that patients are matched to physician quality based on their ability to pay.  We find that 
uninsured and Medicaid patients are generally treated by lower quality physicians.  These effects 
are particularly pronounced in for-profit hospitals.  In addition, we show that physician quality is 
associated with adverse health outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Health care access for the poor and uninsured in the U.S. is an increasingly complex 
problem.  From 2000 to 2005 the number of uninsured persons rose from 39.6 to 46.6 million 
while hundreds of hospital emergency rooms, the primary source of healthcare for many of the 
uninsured, were closed.  Since uninsured patients are less likely to pay for care, increased 
demand for emergency room services by the uninsured and lower hospital payments from private 
insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid, are increasingly placing financial burdens on 
hospitals.  Thus the poor face a health care system which while superficially guaranteeing access, 
has strong incentives to limit the quantity and quality of care.   
A large body of empirical evidence documents adverse health outcomes for the uninsured.  
Baker et al. (2001) and Lichtenberg (2001) find that adult mortality and morbidity were higher 
for the uninsured relative to the insured.  The common explanations that are advanced to explain 
these adverse outcomes rely on the fact that the uninsured generally use fewer preventive and 
screening services and are generally sicker when diagnosed.  Kozak, Hall, and Owings (2001) 
and Pappas et al. (1997) show that the uninsured have higher rates of avoidable hospitalizations.   
Adverse health outcomes for the poor and uninsured can also occur because the quality of 
acute and therapeutic care received by the uninsured may be worse than that received by insured 
patients.  To determine whether the uninsured are treated differently by health providers than the 
insured, the majority of research has compared outcomes such as mortality rates or complication 
rates, or ‘treatments’ such as total charges, length of stay, or receipt of a specific procedure 
across insured and uninsured patients (Canto et al. 2000; Currie and Gruber 1996).  Our study 
focuses on a previously unexplored aspect of care – the quality of physicians treating the under-
uninsured.  We study how physician quality as measured by quality of schooling and residency,  
years of experience, and board certification varies based on the patient’s ability to pay.  In 
particular we are interested in whether poor or uninsured patients are less likely to be treated by 
higher quality physicians.  As a corollary we also examine whether our measures of physician 
quality are related to patients’ health outcomes.     
The actual or perceived quality of the physician treating a patient may be correlated with 
patient outcomes for a number of reasons.  Most obviously physicians with higher quality 
training are expected to provide better care.  In a study of coronary artery bypass surgery in New 
York, Jha and Epstein (2006) show that treatment by the ‘best’ physicians, as measured by risk-
adjusted mortality rates and volume, can reduce mortality in two common cardiac procedures by 
as much as 50%.  In addition to providing better therapeutic care, more skilled physicians may 
have priority access to test results, operating rooms, and better nurses.  There could be placebo 
effects if patients are reassured that they are under the care of the ‘best’ physician.  There is 
certainly a presumption that the quality of physicians is important to patients even if the effects 
on the outcome are not measured. Hospitals and physician groups often advertise where their 
new hires were trained, and many insurance companies attempt to provide information about 
physician attributes to prospective patients.   
The sorting of underinsured patients to lower quality physicians may occur at the physician 
level or at the hospital level.  The reasons for physicians to discriminate against uninsured 
patients are widely known.  Physicians receive payments from Medicare, Medicaid, and 
privately insured companies, yet payment from uninsured patients is not guaranteed.  Medicaid 
patients may also be discriminated against since Medicaid fees paid to physicians in Florida for 
all services were 65% of Medicare fees, on average in 2003 (Zuckerman et al. 2004).  Higher 
quality physicians are more likely to have choices regarding how many and which patients to  
treat, while newer, lesser known physicians are likely to treat all patients, at least in the early 
stages of their careers.  Also, since insured patients pay far less than 100% of costs, their demand 
for medical care is more inelastic than uninsured patients’ demand for care.  Thus physicians 
may induce more care from insured patients.    
While hospitals are required to treat all patients who seek emergency care, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that hospitals are well informed about the exact nature of a patient’s insurance 
coverage; any visit to a hospital typically begins with an inquiry about insurance coverage.  If a 
hospital has financial incentives to attract insured patients over poor and uninsured patients, the 
hospital may sort patients not only by diagnoses but also by insurance status when assigning 
physicians to treat patients.  Although patients cannot typically observe the quality of physician 
they receive upon entering a hospital, the hospital staff and administration are well informed of 
the physicians’ quality.  Thus hospitals may be able to establish formal and/or informal policies 
regarding treatment of the poor.  For instance, in a survey of more than 2,000 physicians at U.S. 
health centers, 13 percent of responding faculty reported formal practice policies limiting care to 
uninsured patients (Weissman et al. 2003).   
Although the uninsured typically pay for less than 100% of their hospital care, hospitals may 
receive payments from government sources to help offset the costs of uncompensated care.   
Based on our calculations from the 2004 Florida hospital data, non-federal short-term general 
hospitals provided $1.9 billion in uncompensated care, but received over $251 million from state 
and local tax appropriations.
1 Yet government payments may not change hospitals’ financial 
incentives for sorting patients since they are not related to the quality of care provided to the 
uninsured.   
Our empirical goal is to test whether there is sorting of physician quality by patients’ ability  
to pay, where patients are classified as uninsured (including charity), on Medicaid, on Medicare, 
or privately insured. Two challenges need to be addressed.  The first is that unobserved 
heterogeneity in illness and other patient health characteristics can drive the physician allocation 
decision.  If uninsured patients are healthier we might expect them to be treated by lower quality 
physicians.  We use a number of patient characteristics to account for such heterogeneity.   
The second challenge is that the quality of the physician treating a patient depends on the 
overall quality of physicians at the attending hospital.  If overall quality of physicians is lower at 
hospitals which treat more uninsured patients, we may see a negative association between 
physician quality and the treatment of uninsured patients; again this would not constitute 
evidence of discrimination within a hospital.   We use a hospital fixed-effect approach to exploit 
within-hospital variation in physician quality and treatment and to explicitly control for hospital 
characteristics that do not vary across patients.   
We also examine whether for-profit, non-profit, and government hospitals differ in their 
treatment of the poor by separating the patient data by these three types of hospital ownership.  A 
number of studies have shown that hospital ownership can affect the care provided to uninsured 
patients (Norton and Staiger 1994; Sloan et al. 2001).  A for-profit hospital may have stronger 
incentives to maximize cash flows from insured patients than would a non-profit or government 
hospital.  For instance, for-profits have been found to bill more or ‘up code’ patient diagnoses 
(Sloan et al. 2001; Silverman and Skinner 2004).  Sloan et al. (2001) also found that for-profit 
hospitals were more expensive to Medicare than not-for-profit hospitals, although there were no 
differences in health outcomes by hospital ownership.       
Our findings support our hypotheses of physician sorting by patient payment type for all 
measures of physician quality.  In particular, uninsured and Medicaid patients are treated by  
physicians from lower ranked schools and residencies, by less experienced physicians, and are 
less likely to be treated by board certified physicians.  Also, even using a somewhat crude 
measure such as in-hospital mortality to measure the impact of physician quality on outcomes, 
we find that being treated by physicians from better schools and more experienced physicians is 
associated with lower in-hospital mortality.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses prior theoretical work on 
treatment quality and describes a conceptual framework within which to view the sorting of 
physician quality by patient’s ability to pay.  The Data and Methods section contains a 
description of the data, discusses descriptive statistics, and describes the empirical model.   
Following that, we present and discuss our empirical results.   The final section concludes and 
identifies possible directions for future research. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The disconnect between third-party payers and insured patients in health care markets results 
in an inherent tension between maintaining quality and minimizing costs. When health care 
providers are reimbursed for the cost of actual care, quality provision is high but there are few 
incentives to minimize costs.  When reimbursed by fixed payments per treatment, providers will 
minimize costs but have no incentive to maintain quality.   The existing literature on treatment 
quality has focused on the cost and quality incentives under various payment schemes under two 
different assumptions of patient demand.  When patient demand is a function of quality, patients 
can enforce the maintenance of quality through their choice of health care providers (Ellis and 
McGuire 1986; Pope 1989).  However, when the patient is not fully informed about the quality 
of care or when quality is an experience good, the patient’s role in maintaining quality is not as  
effective.  Ma (1994) shows that a mixture of cost reimbursement and prospective payment can 
be used to maintain quality and contain costs.  Chalkley and Malcolmson (1998) model the 
behavior of providers when patient demand is independent of quality and show that either cost 
reductions or quality improvements are feasible, but not both, and that behavior depends on the 
benevolence of the providers.    
When patients do not pay for health care a simple matching model shows that providing high 
quality care to non-paying patients is difficult to achieve.  Consider a very simple stylized model 
of the health care market where patient demand is independent of quality.  There are two types of 
physicians, low quality, indexed by L and high quality indexed by H.
1  In common with the 
literature on quality we assume that the costs are strictly increasing in quality so that the cost of 
providing care,  , i = H, L is such that  i c H L cc > .  Each patient buys one unit of health care from a 
physician.  If the patient is insured the insurance company will pay  H P  on her behalf to the 
                                          
1 We do not specifically model the relationship between physician ability (knowledge and skills) 
and physician performance. We assume that our physician quality measures are strong 
determinants of a physician’s abilities.  Leonard, Masatu and Vialou (2007) found that years of 
training is the most important determinant of ability in a study of 80 physicians treating 
potentially serious outpatient conditions. Leonard et al (2007) also concluded that ability is a 
significant determinant of physicians’ adherence to steps required to diagnose their patients’ 
illnesses properly and to steps required to communicate the diagnosis and treatment to the patient 
properly.  Numerous studies have found that physicians who have more experience with a 
particular surgery have lower patient mortality rates and fewer complications than physicians 
with less experience.  
  
physician.  An uninsured patient pays 0 L P = .  Assume that the price paid by the insurance 
company is set to insure participation by high quality physicians in the plan so that H H Pc = .  
This ensures that both high and low quality physicians remain in the market.  In this simple 
matching model, there are four possible matches of physicians and patients. The payoffs from all 
four possibilities can be ordered as follows: 
H L L L H H L H c P c P c P c P − > − > − > − .  Given our assumptions on the costs of quality and 
payments, the payoff is highest when a low quality physician treats an insured patient and lowest 
when a high quality physician treats an uninsured patient.  
In this type of model with fixed payments and quality that is not contractible, clearly both 
physicians and hospitals have an incentive to reduce quality in order to increase profits. Insured 
patients may find it possible to avoid the problem of the best payers being treated by the worst 
physicians by establishing a relationship with a physician, through payment plans which monitor 
and enforce a certain quality level or through cost reimbursement plans. Uninsured patients do 
not have the same protections. 
Using hospital discharge data, it is not possible to discern whether this sorting behavior can 
be attributed to hospitals or physicians.  Our discussions with local physicians revealed that 
when an uninsured patient arrives at a hospital emergency room, either the Emergency Room 
(ER) physician on call or a hospitalist first treats the patient.  If a cardiology consult is required, 
the primary physician then calls in a specialist.  Most physicians that we spoke with saw patients 
when it was their turn – apparently as a result of rotation of ER assignments through the practice, 
or as a favor to the physician calling them to consult.  This suggests that the sorting revealed in 
this paper could result from network effects.  If the initial physician contacted is younger or from 
a lower ranked school, he or she might arrange a consultation with a physician from the same  
cohort.  In addition, higher quality physicians may be busier and less able to accept new patients.   
Similar incentives would be at work in hospitals, particularly for their salaried physicians.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
      Our study examines all inpatients treated in Florida hospitals for procedures classified 
under the major diagnostic category of ‘Diseases and Disorders of the Circulatory System,’ 
which are procedures related to the heart.  Many previous studies have focused on patients with 
heart disease to study questions of hospital behavior towards the treatment of patients based on 
insurance status (Canto et al. 2000; Hadley et al. 1992; Young and Cohen 1991; Kreindel et al. 
1997).  By focusing on one medical specialty, we avoid potential estimation bias that could result 
from correlations between the number of uninsured within a specialty and average physician 
quality across specialties.  We use patient and hospital data from all four quarters in 2004, 
provided by the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.  Florida inpatient hospital 
records are matched to data on physician and hospital characteristics.   
Quality of care is measured by the quality of the operating physician who treats the patient, 
or if the patient does not have an operating physician, the quality of the attending physician.  
Data on physicians are provided by the Medical Quality Assurance division of the Florida 
Department of Health.  We use providers’ first year in practice, board certification, and medical 
school and residency attended to construct our measures of physician quality –years of 
experience, board certification in an area related to cardiac care, and residency and school 
quality.  Our measure of medical school quality is the ranking assigned by the U.S. News & 
World Report (USNWR), which ranks medical schools in the U.S. (U.S. News & World Report, 
2006).  Medical schools with the lowest USNWR rankings are expected to produce the highest  
quality physicians.  We measure residency quality by determining whether or not the physician 
completed a residency at one of the top fifty heart hospitals in the US, using rankings published 
by the U.S. News and World Report (U.S. News & World Report, 2006).   
Board certification has requirements beyond obtaining a M.D. or D.O. and completing a 
residency program at an accredited school.  Physicians must also pass examinations given by a 
specialty board, and many boards require evaluations from the physicians’ medical colleagues.   
The exact relationship between years of experience and physician quality is ambiguous.  For 
cardiac-related procedures, several studies have shown that higher volumes of coronary artery 
bypass graft surgeries by hospitals and physicians are associated with lower mortality rates (Wen 
et al. 2006; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2004).  While physicians with more 
experience may have more learning-by-doing, younger and less experienced physicians may be 
more familiar with the latest technologies in cardiac care. 
A patient’s Diagnosis Related Grouping is a key measure of the patient’s clinical need for 
care.  Within each of the four categories of DRGs created by the authors based on diagnosis 
severity, the average years of experience was sixteen.  Years of experience and patients’ survival 
probabilities (measured by the ICISS) are compared in Table 1, along with the other physician 
quality measures.  Physicians’ years of experience is significantly negatively correlated with 
patients’ survival probability at diagnosis (ICISS), suggesting that physicians with more years of 
experience are typically assigned to patients with lower survival probabilities.   
Summary statistics are shown in Table 2.  The patient records indicate the primary source of 
expected reimbursement to the hospital for service.  We group the payment categories into four 
payment types: uninsured, Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance. 
There are 479,670 inpatient records with heart-related diagnoses that match data on hospitals  
and physicians.  We only include patients in general or teaching hospitals and who the hospital 
has prioritized as an emergency or urgent admission, as opposed to an elective admission, since 
patients who have time to schedule appointments with physicians may be able to wait for 
treatment by their personal physician or obtain recommendations for a particular physician.   
After merging all patient, physician, and hospital data meeting these categories we have 405,177 
inpatient records in our sample.  Our final exclusion is to include records only if the data indicate 
the hospital treated at least 5 patients, and there are at least three physicians working in the 
hospital. After these final exclusions we have 405,168 observations for our estimated model. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
The mean comparisons of physician quality in Table 2 provide mixed results on insurance-
based discrimination. By conditioning on observed patient characteristics, comparisons can be 
made while controlling for health severity. We also use hospital fixed effects to exploit within-
hospital variation in the quality of physicians available.  Although much research has looked at 
the determinants of a patient’s choice of hospital, there has been very little work on the variance 
in patients’ treatment within a hospital (an exception is Doyle 2005).  By using fixed effects, 
hospital characteristics that are constant across patients within the hospital, such as 
administrative policies, available technology, and average physician quality, are held constant.     
As mentioned before, an uninsured patient may be treated by a lower quality physician 
because of screening by physicians or hospitals, or because of the hospital and location choices 
of patients and physicians. To estimate a patient’s treatment within a hospital, our level of 
observation is patient-physician-hospital specific.  We estimated the continuous measures of 
physician quality, experience and medical school score as OLS regressions.  For person i treated  
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where   is the physician’s years of experience or ranking of the physician’s medical 
school; coefficients 
pih qual
, , 2 1 β β  and  3 β  measure the relationships between the patient payment type 
of uninsured, Medicaid, or commercially insured, respectively, and physician quality.  The 
omitted patients are Medicare patients.  In addition to the patients’ characteristics described in 
Table 2, we include indicators for day admitted (Sunday–Thursday).  Finally,  h μ represents the 
hospital fixed effects.  
When physician quality is measured by the quality of medical schools, we are faced with the 
problem that U.S. News & World Report Rankings are unavailable for international medical 
graduates (IMGs).  This issue is addressed with a selection model by using the Heckman two 
step method.  We estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether the patient was treated by a physician who graduated from a U.S. medical school.  From 
the probit model we obtain the linear predictors in order to calculate the Mill’s ratio,  . λ   The 
inverse Mill’s ratio is then incorporated into equation (1) where the dependent variable is the 
USNWR Ranking of the medial school attended by the physician treating the patient.  We then 
estimate equation (1) only on patients who were treated by physician graduates of U.S. medical 
schools.
2  
A physician’s residency site is also an important measure of physician quality.  A physician 
                                          
2 The probit and regression models for domestically-trained physicians and medical school 
rankings, respectively, are only estimated for hospitals who have data on physicians’ medical 
schools for at least two-thirds of their inpatients.    
who graduates from the top of the class at a lower ranked school and completes a high quality 
residency is comparable to a physician who graduates at the bottom of the class at a top ranked 
school and completes a residency at a poor hospital.  Thus we also estimate a probit model where 
the dependent variable equals one if the patient is treated by a physician who completed a 
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where   is the indicator variable.   pih qual top_
When our measure of quality is whether a physician is board certified, we estimate a probit 
model where the dependent variable equals one if the patient is treated by a physician who is 




Commercial Medicaid Uninsured brd
ν φ γ
γ γ γ γ
+ + +
+ + + =
4
3 2 1 0                                               (3)  
where   is an indicator for whether or not the physician treating the patient is board 
certified.  Letting Q represent all right-hand side variables and using the usual exogeneity 
assumptions: 
pih brd
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As frequently discussed in the literature, there is a strong likelihood that the researcher does 
not observe all indicators of patient health that are perceived by hospital staff and used in 
treatment decisions.  If there are unobserved health differences between the uninsured and 
insured patients’ health that influence treatment decisions, estimated results could be biased.   
In addition to patient demographic information such as age and race, we include three 
controls for patients’ health.  First, within the primary cardiac diagnosis code, we categorize 
diagnosis related groupings (DRGs) according to average charges per case.  We create four  
diagnoses severity indicators: ‘very severe’, ‘severe’, ‘somewhat severe’ and ‘mild,’ where the 
latter is the omitted category.
3  We expect patients with ‘highest’ and ‘high’ severity of 
diagnoses to be treated with higher quality physicians, all else equal.   
Second, we control for 11 secondary diagnoses which would indicate the health status of the 
patient at the time of admission, following Baker et al. (2001): diabetes, hypertension, cancer, 
dementia, stroke, vascular disease, an old myocardial infarction, other heart disease, pulmonary 
disease, respiratory disease, and obesity. 
We also construct a measure of survival risk, the ICD-9 Injury Severity Score (ICISS).  For 
each of the patient’s ICD-9 diagnoses (one primary and up to nine secondary), survival risk 
ratios (SRRs) are derived by dividing the number of survivors in each ICD-9 code by the total 
number of patients with the same ICD-9 code.  ICISS is calculated as the simple product of the 
SRRs for each of the patient’s diagnoses.  The ICISS has been shown to outperform other 
standard measures of patient severity in recent empirical work by Osler et al. (1996); Rutledge et 
al. (1998); and Huynh et al. (1998).  We use the entire population of 2,512,406 inpatients to 
construct the ICISS. 
 
Hospital Ownership Status 
Since we are including hospital fixed effects in our estimation, we cannot obtain the effects 
of hospital characteristics on the sorting of uninsured patients by physician quality.  The 
ownership and teaching status of hospitals are the hospital characteristics most commonly 
discussed in both theoretical and empirical literature.     
Hospitals with different ownership status may have different incentives for treating poor 
                                          
3 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a list of DRGs in each of the four categories.  
patients, as mentioned previously.  Since government hospitals are typically mandated to provide 
care to the poor, a greater percentage of their patients may be poor, limiting the hospitals’ 
capacity to sort patients by insurance status to different quality physicians.  In order to determine 
whether there are differences in patient sorting by physician quality across hospital ownership 
types, we split our sample and run equations (1) – (3) on all patients in each of the four hospital 
types: government, not-for-profit, teaching, and for-profit hospitals.  Teaching hospitals are not 
included in the other three ownership categories because amongst both providers and patients, 
there is a perception that teaching hospitals a) have the highest quality physicians; and b) have a 
greater percentage of uninsured patients than (non-teaching) not-for-profit and for-profit 
hospitals.  In our sample the range of physician quality was smaller in teaching hospitals than in 
non-teaching hospitals, and the average quality much higher when measured by medical school 
ranking.  Of the 13 teaching hospitals in our sample, 11 are not-for-profits and 2 are government-
owned.   
We chose to separate the sample by ownership status rather than to include right-hand side 
indicators for three of the four ownership types because previous research has indicated that 
hospital ownership status is related to characteristics of the hospital’s location, some of which 
are not observable to the researcher (Norton and Staiger 1994).  If these unobserved location 
characteristics also affect the mean quality of physicians, then hospital ownership is endogenous 
and the results would be biased.     
 
Mortality 
To test the effect of physician quality on patient outcomes, we estimate a Cox proportional 
hazards model on inpatient mortality.  We are interested in how the conditional probability a  
patient dies within the hospital given survival to time t relates to physician quality and other 
covariates, including patients’ health and insurance status, and to hospital characteristics. The 
number of days from the admission date is the duration measure.  The proportional hazard is 
written as  
() ( ){ } z t h z t h
T β exp | 0 =  
where the baseline hazard   is common to all patients and the individual hazard functions 
differ proportionately based on observed covariates, z.  The vector of regression coefficients is 
.  Estimated hazard ratios will be reported in the Results section.  There are no 
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Compared to equations (1) – (3), the Cox proportional hazard model includes hospital 
characteristics rather than hospital fixed effects, and only includes patients who were discharged 
home or who died within the hospital.  This excludes patients discharged to hospice or other 
institutions.  The vector of covariates z includes all patient characteristics used in estimating 
equations (1) – (3), and hospital characteristics.  Hospital characteristics that are specific to the 
hospital are number of hospital beds, number of open heart cases the previous year, number of 
full time nurses, and indicators for ownership status of government, for-profit, or teaching (non-
profits are omitted comparison category).  We also include the Herfindahl index (based on 
hospitals’ volume of inpatients) for the hospital’s county to proxy for the level of competition 
within the county; and the total population and median income in the hospital’s county to proxy 
for demand for care.   
 
RESULTS 
Tables 3 and 4 report results from estimating equations (1) – (3).  Results in Table 3 show  
that relative to Medicare patients, uninsured patients are more likely to be treated by physicians 
who are international medical school graduates or from lower quality U.S. medical schools, and 
Medicaid patients are more likely to be treated by physicians from lower quality U.S. medical 
schools or whose residency was not completed at a top ranked heart hospital; all results are 
significant at the one or five percent level of significance.  Both uninsured and Medicaid patients 
are more likely to be treated by physicians who have fewer years of experience, and who are less 
likely to be board certified, again all results are significant at the one or five percent level of 
significance. 
 In the cardiac care category that we are studying, Medicaid payments are significantly lower 
than private insurance payments, and often below costs (Florida Hospital Association 2006).  
Since providers are guaranteed a payment rate lower than that received by Medicare and by 
private insurance companies, higher quality physicians may be unlikely to accept Medicaid 
patients.   
The results in column (3) of Table 3 present the estimated coefficients for the probit model, 
where the dependent variable is an indicator the physician is board certified.  Relative to 
Medicare patients, being uninsured decreased the probability of receiving a board certified 
physician by 7.1 percentage points.  Having Medicaid decreases the probability of receiving a 
board certified physician by 6.4 percentage points, relative to Medicare patients.
4 
                                          
4 We obtained the predicted values when the uninsured (Medicaid) indicator equals zero, and 
when it equals one.  The Medicaid (uninsured) and commercial insurance indicators were set to 
zero and means of all other right-hand side variables used.  The predicted value of an uninsured, 
Medicaid, or Medicare patient receiving a board certified physician is 0.61, 0.39, or 0.68, 
respectively.  Using the cumulative standard normal distribution function evaluated at each of the  
Next we divide the sample by hospital ownership to determine if this sorting process varies 
across different hospital ownership types.  In Table 4 all hospital types treat uninsured patients 
with lower quality physicians, using at least one measure of physician quality (these models 
include the same independent variables shown in Table 3, but only the coefficients on ability to 
pay are presented).  In not-for-profit hospitals, the most common type of hospital in Florida, 
uninsured cardiac inpatients are treated by less experienced physicians and are less likely to be 
treated by a board certified physician.  However the schooling effect is most pronounced – as 
might be expected – in for-profit hospitals.  For-profit hospitals consistently use physicians from 
worse schools, less experienced physicians and physicians who are less likely to be board 
certified in treating uninsured and Medicaid patients. 
 
Effects of Physician quality on in-hospital mortality 
Correlations in Table 1 indicate that patients with the worse health are treated by physicians 
from the top medical schools and more experienced physicians. Board-certified physicians tend 
to treat patients with lower survival probabilities but there is no correlation with patient 
mortality.  Physicians with residencies from the top heart hospitals tend to treat patients with 
higher survival probabilities and lower mortality risks.  (Note however that these correlations do 
not take the physician or hospital locations into account) In Table 5 the effect of physician 
quality on in-hospital mortality is estimated by conditioning on observable patient and hospital 
characteristics to (partially) control for patient health and hospital resources. Coefficient results 
                                                                                                                                       
predicted values, the marginal effect of being uninsured or on Medicaid is -0.024 or -0.021, 
respectively. 
  
for patient payment status and hospital characteristics are shown. Full results with all patient 
characteristics are available from the authors upon request.   
In column (1) of Table 5 when no physician quality measures are included in the model, 
uninsured patients are more likely and Medicaid patients less likely to die within the hospital 
than Medicare patients, conditional on patient characteristics.  After physician characteristics are 
added, uninsured patients still have a higher mortality risk.  However, the mortality risk 
associated with being uninsured is lower when physician characteristics are incorporated which 
suggests that part of the reason uninsured patients have worse outcomes is lower physician 
quality.  Hospitals with more nurses and teaching hospitals are consistently associated with lower 
mortality risk.   
Since the physician characteristics are closely correlated with each other (see Table 1), we 
estimated the model with each aspect of physician quality separately as well as with all 
characteristics included (column 6 in Table 5).  Physicians from worse ranked schools were 
associated with significantly higher mortality hazard.  Residency at a top 50 heart hospital and 
more experience lowered mortality risk.  Only school ranking is significant when all measures of 
physician quality are included. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Using cardiac patients requiring urgent care, we compared the quality of physicians treating 
patients of different insurance status within a hospital.  Overall there is strong evidence that 
patients who are uninsured or on Medicaid are significantly more likely to be treated by lower 
quality physicians.  Controlling for patient characteristics and the quality and availability of other 
physicians within a hospital using hospital fixed effects, uninsured and Medicaid patients are  
more likely to be treated by physicians who are not board certified, are from lower quality 
medical schools and residency hospitals, and who have fewer years of experience.  After 
separating our data by hospital ownership type, we further find that all types of hospitals treat 
uninsured patients with lower quality physicians by at least one measure of physician quality.   
We also determined that in each hospital type Medicaid patients were discriminated against 
using at least one of the physician quality measures.  Since Medicaid patients provide some level 
of payment to providers whereas the uninsured may not, there is a question of why Medicaid 
patients are at least as likely to be discriminated against.  One answer is that hospitals can be 
altruistic, and therefore derive utility from the provision of care to the uninsured but this altruism 
may not extend to Medicaid patients.  Frank and Salkever (1991) argue that even for-profit 
hospitals have an incentive to provide care to the uninsured because the provision of such care 
may have a positive impact on the hospital’s rapport with regulatory agencies.  This effect may 
also be illustrative of the unintended consequences that result when moral incentives to do 
charity work are replaced by minimal economic incentives - good physicians no longer feel 
obligated to treat poor patients covered by Medicaid but are still willing to treat uninsured 
patients.
5 
Previous studies have found that the uninsured receive less medical care than the insured 
(Currie and Thomas 1995; Doyle 2005; Spillman 1992).  Our results suggest that sorting 
uninsured and Medicaid patients to lower quality physicians is another result of poor access to 
quality health care.  Our finding that the quality of physicians treating uninsured patients is lower 
has implications for health outcomes.  Using admittedly limited data on in-hospital mortality we 
                                          
5 Or as one physician put it – he would rather treat uninsured patients who are grateful for the 
care received than Medicaid patients who view it as their due even though they are not paying 
the full costs of care.  
show that physician quality as measured by education, experience and training all have an impact 
on patient mortality. 
 Numerous states have attempted to develop plans for near universal health care coverage 
within the state.  As these plans are implemented states should carefully consider how their 
provider payment design affects the incentives for providers to provide not only access to care 
but quality care to the poor.   
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Table 1. Pairwise Correlations: Physician Quality and Patient Severity Measures, Year = 2004. 









        
 
US News & 
World Report 




     
US News &  
World Report   
1.000        
Rankings of US 
Medical 
       
Schools          
          
Years of Experience       –0.083  1.000       
 (0.000)         
          
Board Certified       –0.073  0.223    1.000     
 (0.000)  (0.000)       
          
Top 50 Residency       –0.198   0.059     0.100         1.000   
Heart Hospital   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)     
          
ICISS –    0.007  -0.013     0.010          0.015  1.000 
Survival Probability   (0.004)   (0.000)    (0.000)         (0.000)   
          
Patients’ Mortality        –0.004   0.008   –0.001         –0.006         –0.410 
   (0.009)   (0.000)    (0.545)          (0.001)  (0.000) 
    
Table 1 shows pairwise correlation coefficients with significance level in parentheses. 
A physician is coded as having board certification if certified in one of the following fields: 
Anesthesiology, Cardiac, Emergency, Family, Internal Medicine, Non Surgical-other, Other Surgical, 
Pathology, Pediatrics, or Radiology. 














 Table 2. Patient, Physician, and Hospital Characteristics, by Patient Payment Type, Year = 2004.
                                                   Min        Max      Overall   Uninsured Medicaid Commercial   Medicare
Number of Persons:  0  1 310,067 26,175 24,689 90,459 253,922
Physician Characteristics:   
Median Medical School  1 125 59 59 60  60  59
Residency at Top 50  0 1 23 23 22  23  22
Median Years of Experience 0  1 14 14 14  14  14
Board Certified (%)
4 0  1 75 72 73  76  76
International medical school  0 1 35 36 36  36  35
Hospital Characteristics:    
Not for Profit (%) 0  1 42 35 33  43  44
Government (%) 0  1 10 16 10  9  9
For-profit (%) 0  1 40 36 42  39  41
Teaching (%) 0  1 8 13 15  9  6
Patient Characteristics:    
Deceased (%) 0  100 2.3 1.3 1.6  1.1 2.9
Age Indicators (%):    
  Age 0-2 yrs  0  1 < 1 < 1 2 < 1 0
  Age 3-39 yrs 0  1 5 16 17  10  1
  Age 40-49 yrs 0  1 10 30 24  22  2
  Age 50-59 yrs 0  1 15 31 28  34  5
  Age 60-69 yrs 0  1 19 16 20  23  17
  Age 70-79 yrs 0  1 25 3 6 6  37
  Over 79 yrs 0  1 26 2 3 4  38
Female (%) 0  1 50 40 57  44  52
Black (%) 0  1 14 25 31  15  11
Hispanic (%) 0  1 13 20 28  12  11
ICISS (patient survival risk) 0  1 79 85 80  85  76
DRG Severity (%):    
  Very Severe  0  1 7 6 5 7  7
  Severe  0  1 17 13 11  17  19
  Somewhat Severe  0  1 30 23 33  22  33
  Mild 0  1 46 59 51  54  42
Secondary Diagnoses (%):    
  Diabetes  0  1 16 16 22  16  16
  Cancer 0  1 2 1 2 2  3
  Dementia  0  1 2 < 1 1 1  3
  Hypertension 0  1 36 37 35  40  34
  Stroke  0  1 2 1 2 1  3
  Vascular Disease  0  1 2 1 2 2  3
  Pulmonary Disease   0  1 19 13 21  11  22
  Respiratory Disease  0  1 5 3 4 3  5
  Prior Myocardial Infarction  0  1 3 4 3 4  3
  Obese   0  1 17 18 19  19  15
  Other Heart Disease  0  1 30 21 22  21  34
1. Based on the US News & World Report Rankings of Medical Schools, Select rank, in 2005 
2. There are 177,394 patients treated by physicians with data on school ranking: 12,119 uninsured,    
    11,177 on  Medicaid, 113,007 on Medicare, and 41,091 with private insurance. 
3.  There are 257,513 patients treated by physicians with data on residencies: 17,984 uninsured, 16,756   
     on Medicaid, 163,802 on Medicare, and 58,971 with private insurance. 
4. There are 269,487 patients treated by physicians with data on board certification: 18,660 uninsured,  
    17,400 on Medicaid, 171,925 on Medicare, and 61,502 with private insurance.,593 on  Medicaid, 186,110 on   
    Medicare, and 68,000 with private insurance. 
 Table 3. Patient Payment Type and Physician Quality
  Domestically Trained  Medical School  
Ranking 
Years of Experience  Board Certification  Residency at  
Top 50 Hospital 
  (n =292,753 ) (n =177,394 ) (n =310,067 ) (n =269,487 ) (n =257,513 ) 
Payment Type:    
Uninsured -0.038***  (0.011) 0.787** (0.342) -0.676***  (0.076) -0.078*** (0.012) 0.005 (0.013) 
Medicaid  -0.016    (0.012) 1.025*** (0.344) -0.340***  (0.077) -0.068*** (0.013) -0.031** (0.014) 
Private Insurance    0.004  (0.008) 0.584** (0.233) -0.114**  (0.052) 0.016* (0.009) 0.023** (0.009) 
Patient      
Age 0-2 years -0.144**  (0.067) 1.633 (1.959) -0.529  (0.440) 0.246*** (0.075) 0.423*** (0.067) 
Age 3-39 years -0.020  (0.014) -0.215 (0.416) 0.439***  (0.094) -0.004 (0.015) 0.047*** (0.016) 
Age 40-49 years -0.015 (0.011) 0.580* (0.335) -0.547***  (0.075) 0.005 (0.012) -0.009 (0.013) 
Age 50-59 years -0.009 (0.010) 0.354 (0.297) -0.409***  (0.067) 0.003 (0.011) -0.001 (0.012) 
Age 60-69 years -0.009 (0.008) 0.487** (0.241) -0.458***  (0.055) 0.011 (0.009) -0.019** (0.010) 
Age 70-79 years -0.011 (0.007) 0.183 (0.207) -0.304***  (0.048) 0.012 (0.008) 0.003 (0.008) 
Female   0.001  (0.005) -0.180 (0.149) 0.035  (0.034) -0.016*** (0.006) 0.006 (0.006) 
Black -0.040***  (0.008) 0.481** (0.235) -0.263***  (0.053) -0.028*** (0.008) -0.009*** (0.009) 
Hispanic -0.031***  (0.010) 0.577** (0.292) -0.334***  (0.064) -0.032*** (0.011) 0.026** (0.011) 
ICD 9 Injury   -0.043**  (0.018) -0.067 (0.583) -0.232*  (0.135) 0.232*** (0.022) 0.037 (0.023) 
DRG Severity:    
Very Severe   0.089***  (0.011) -4.952*** (0.321) -0.379***  (0.078) 0.012 (0.330) -0.102*** (0.014) 
Severe   0.070***  (0.007) -0.154 (0.221) 0.143**  (0.050) 0.257*** (0.008) -0.030*** (0.009) 
Somewhat Severe   0.020***  (0.006) 0.037 (0.189) -0.053  (0.043) 0.135*** (0.007) -0.031*** (0.007) 
Secondary Diagnoses:    
Diabetes   0.060 (0.200) -0.034  (0.045) -0.004 (0.007) -0.016** (0.008) 
Cancer   -0.782 (0.481) 0.294***  (0.111) -0.004 (0.018) 0.019 (0.019) 
Dementia   1.278** (0.506) -0.196*  (0.117) 0.010 (0.018) -0.012 (0.019) 
Hypertension   -0.124 (0.162) -0.101***  (0.037) 0.007 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 
Stroke   0.119 (0.496) -0.019  (0.114) 0.032* (0.019) 0.014 (0.020) 
Vascular Disease    -0.210 (0.473) 0.038  (0.107) 0.054*** (0.018) -0.036* (0.019) 
Previous Myocardial   0.380 (0.390) 0.243***  (0.091) 0.057*** (0.015) -0.005 (0.015) 
Obese   -0.332* (0.198) 0.078*  (0.045) -0.003 (0.007) -0.000 (0.007) 
Other Heart Disease     0.141 (0.167) 0.116***  (0.038) -0.002 (0.006) -0.001 (0.007) 
Foreign     2.512***  (0.036) -0.103*** (0.006) -0.250*** (0.006) 
Inverse Mills Ratio       -13.910*** (0.565)  
Constant -42.169***  (0.503) 56.294*** (1.191) 19.319***  (0.204) 0.560*** (0.042) -0.148*** (0.043) 
Pseudo R-squared     0.06    0.10 0.06   0.05 0.07
Models include hospital fixed effects and indicators for days of the week.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Omitted are patients who are on Medicare, aged over 79, and with mild DRGs. 
  
Table 4. Patient Payment Type and Quality of Physician, by Hospital Type 
Payment Type Hospital Type
A. Domestically Trained 
Government Not for Investor Owned Teaching
Uninsured -0.214*** -0.007 -0.035* 0.082**
  (0.031  (0.019) (0.019 (0.035)
Medicaid -0.073** -0.005 -0.004 -0.024
  (0.037)  (0.020) (0.018) (0.032)
Commercial Insurance  -0.060** 0.046*** -0.005 -0.085***
  (0.026  (0.012) (0.012) (0.027)
Number of  28,99 124,576 117,300 22,055
Pseudo R-squared 0.10  0.07 0.06 0.06 
B.  Medical School Ranking 
Government Not for Profit Investor Owned Teaching
Uninsured 1.304  -1.210** 2.536*** 1.531
  (1.005)  (0.537) (0.550) (1.142)
Medicaid -0.297  0.079 2.245*** -0.136
  (1.150  (0.567) (0.523) (1.033)
Commercial Insurance  0.131  0.782** 0.673* -0.876
  (0.808  (0.353) (0.360) (0.915)
Number of  16,977 75,145 73285 11,801
Pseudo R-squared 0.11  0.12 0.09 0.03 
C. Physician’s Years of Experience
Government Not for Profit Investor Teaching
Uninsured -1.922*** -0.340*** -0.516*** -0.505**
  (0.210)  (0.127) (0.120) (0.228)
Medicaid -1.177*** -0.204 -0.280** -0.217
  (0.259)  (0.133) (0.114) (0.216)
Commercial Insurance  -0.430** -0.084 -0.047 -0.218
  (0.183)  (0.083) (0.079) (0.179)
Number of  29,931 130,891 125,169 23,753
R-squared 0.08  0.07 0.06 0.04 
D. Indicator Physician is Board Certified
Government Not for Profit Investor Owned Teaching
Uninsured -0.090*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.185***
  (0.033)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.038)
Medicaid -0.055  -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.100***
  (0.040)  (0.022) (0.019) (0.035)
Commercial Insurance   0.088*** -0.031** 0.039***  0.057*
  (0.029)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.031)
Number of  26,237 113,026 109,393 20,532
Pseudo R-squared 0.06  0.04 0.05 0.04 
E.  Physician Completed Residency or Fellowship in Top 50 Cardiac Hospital 
Government Not for Profit Investor Teaching
Uninsured -0.037  0.013 0.028 -0.040
  (0.037)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.042)
Medicaid -0.031  0.003 -0.081***   0.338
  (0.044)  (0.023) (0.021) (0.040)
Commercial Insurance  0.056*  0.019 0.024 0.008
  (0.031)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.034)
Number of  24,444 108,580 105,296 18,908
Pseudo R-squared 0.08  0.06 0.09 0.09 
Models include hospital fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
All results are relative to Medicare patients. Models were estimated using all variables shown in 
Table 3.  Results for all variables available from authors upon request.  
 
 
Table 5:  Effect of Physician Quality on In-Hospital Mortality.  Cox Hazard Ratio estimates 
with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Physician 
Quality 
       
School Ranking    1.001**     1.002*** 
Top Residency     0.936*    0.963 
Board 
Certification 




Experience       0.993*  0.999 
Experience x 
Experience 
     1.000** 
 
1.000 
Payment type         
Uninsured  1.336***  1.249**  1.369*** 1.411*** 1.502*** 1.262** 
Medicaid  0.820***  0.852* 0.865* 0.849**  0.820***  0.914 
Private 
Insurance 
1.043 1.072  1.011 
 
1.007 0.988 1.057 
Hospital 
Characteristics 
       






























































































         
N  302,487  143,723 202,221 208,688 219,616 120,529 
Wald chi2  23695.98  44  16662.45 17177.09 17877.73 10089.21 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
All models include county and patient demographics, ICD injury severity score and indicators for 
secondary patient diagnoses and days of the week.  Estimation results for all included variables 




 Table A1. Diagnosis Related Groupings and Four Categories of Severity  
DRG  MDC  TYPE  DRG TITLE  WEIGHTS DRG Severity 
139 05 MED  CARDIAC  ARRHYTHMIA & CONDUCTION DISORDERS W/O CC 0.5234 Mild
140 05 MED  ANGINA  PECTORIS 0.5275 Mild
133 05 MED  ATHEROSCLEROSIS  W/O  CC 0.5411 Mild
143 05 MED  CHEST  PAIN  0.5643 Mild
131 05 MED  PERIPHERAL  VASCULAR DISORDERS W/O CC 0.5655 Mild
145  05  MED  OTHER CIRCULATORY SYSTEM DIAGNOSES W/O CC 0.5850 Mild
136  05  MED  CARDIAC CONGENITAL & VALVULAR DISORDERS AGE >17 W/O CC 0.5902 Mild
142  05  MED  SYNCOPE & COLLAPSE W/O CC 0.5929 Mild
134 05 MED  HYPERTENSION 0.6091 Mild
132 05 MED  ATHEROSCLEROSIS  W  CC 0.6428 Mild
524 01 MED  TRANSIENT  ISCHEMIA  0.7414 Mild
128  05  MED  DEEP VEIN THROMBOPHLEBITIS 0.7475 Mild
141  05  MED  SYNCOPE & COLLAPSE W CC 0.7617 Mild
137  05  MED  CARDIAC CONGENITAL & VALVULAR DISORDERS AGE 0-17 0.8249 Mild
138  05  MED  CARDIAC ARRHYTHMIA & CONDUCTION DISORDERS W CC 0.8413 Mild
135  05  MED  CARDIAC CONGENITAL & VALVULAR DISORDERS AGE >17 W CC 0.9264 Mild
130 05 MED  PERIPHERAL  VASCULAR DISORDERS W CC 0.9566 Mild
122 05 MED  CIRCULATORY  DISORDERS W AMI W/O MAJOR COMP, DISCHARGED ALIVE 1.0127 Mild
129 05 MED  CARDIAC  ARREST, UNEXPLAINED 1.0346 Mild
127  05  MED  HEART FAILURE & SHOCK 1.0390 Mild
125  05  MED  CIRCULATORY DISORDERS EXCEPT AMI, W CARD CATH W/O COMPLEX DIAG 1.1146 Somewhat Severe 
530  01  SURG  VENTRICULAR SHUNT PROCEDURES W/O CC  1.1945 Somewhat Severe 
144  05  MED  OTHER CIRCULATORY SYSTEM DIAGNOSES W CC 1.2502 Somewhat Severe 
117  05  SURG  CARDIAC PACEMAKER REVISION EXCEPT DEVICE REPLACEMENT 1.3529 Somewhat Severe 
124  05  MED  CIRCULATORY DISORDERS EXCEPT AMI, W CARD CATH & COMPLEX DIAG 1.4564 Somewhat Severe 
123  05  MED  CIRCULATORY DISORDERS W AMI, EXPIRED 1.5421 Somewhat Severe 
121 05 MED  CIRCULATORY  DISORDERS W AMI & MAJOR COMP, DISCHARGED ALIVE 1.6200 Somewhat Severe 
118 05 SURG  CARDIAC  PACEMAKER  DEVICE REPLACEMENT  1.6751  Severe 
518  05  SURG  PERC CARDIO PROC W/O CORONARY ARTERY STENT OR AMI   1.7509  Severe  
 
 Table A1., cont’d. 
DRG  MDC  TYPE  DRG TITLE  WEIGHTS DRG Severity 
517 05 SURG  PERC CARDIO PROC W NON-DRUG ELUTING STENT W/O AMI   2.1106  Severe 
529 01 SURG  VENTRICULAR SHUNT PROCEDURES W CC   2.2165  Severe 
120  05  SURG  OTHER CIRCULATORY SYSTEM O.R. PROCEDURES  2.3051  Severe 
527 05 SURG  PERCUTNEOUS  CARDIOVASULAR  PROC  W DRUG ELUTING STENT W/O AMI   2.3282  Severe 
116  05  SURG  OTHER PERMANENT CARDIAC PACEMAKER IMPLANT  2.3561  Severe 
111 05 SURG  MAJOR  CARDIOVASCULAR  PROCEDURES W/O CC  2.4488  Severe 
126  05  MED  ACUTE & SUBACUTE ENDOCARDITIS  2.6051  Severe 
516 05 SURG  PERCUTANEOUS  CARDIOVASC PROC W AMI   2.6457  Severe 
526 05 SURG  PERCUTNEOUS  CARDIOVASULAR  PROC W DRUG ELUTING STENT W AMI  2.9741  Severe 
115  05  SURG  PRM CARD PACEM IMPL W AMI/HR/SHOCK OR AICD LEAD OR GNRTR 3.5928  Very  Severe 
109  05  SURG  CORONARY BYPASS W/O PTCA OR CARDIAC CATH  3.9450  Very Severe 
110 05 SURG  MAJOR  CARDIOVASCULAR  PROCEDURES W CC  3.9587  Very Severe 
108 05 SURG  OTHER  CARDIOTHORACIC  PROCEDURES 5.1702  Very  Severe 
107  05  SURG  CORONARY BYPASS W CARDIAC CATH  5.3757  Very Severe 
515 05 SURG  CARDIAC  DEFIBRILLATOR  IMPLANT  W/O CARDIAC CATH   5.4339  Very Severe 
105  05  SURG  CARDIAC VALVE & OTH MAJOR CARDIOTHORACIC PROC W/O CARD CATH  5.7937  Very Severe 
536  05  SURG  CARDIAC DEFIB IMPLANT W CARDIAC CATH W/O AMI/HF/SHOCK  6.2417  Very Severe 
528 01 SURG  INTRACRANIAL  VASCULAR  PROC W PDX (Principal Diagnosis) HEMORRHAGE  6.8481  Very Severe 
106 05 SURG  CORONARY  BYPASS  W PTCA  7.3062  Very Severe 
535  05  SURG  CARDIAC DEFIBRILLATOR IMPLANT W CARDIAC CATH W AMI/HF/SHOCK   7.6973  Very Severe 
104  05  SURG  CARDIAC VALVE & OTH MAJOR CARDIOTHORACIC PROC W CARD CATH 7.9180  Very  Severe 
525  05  SURG  OTHER HEART ASSIST SYSTEM IMPLANT   11.3749  Very Severe 
103  PRE  SURG  HEART TRANSPLANT OR IMPLANT OF HEART ASSIST SYSTEM  19.5514  Very Severe 
Source: Federal Register, Table 5.  Vol. 70 FR 47617, August 12, 2005.
 
 
 
 